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ABSTRACT 
Though there is strong agreement in the literature that community participation in disaster recovery is crucial, there is 
a lack of consensus over what might constitute a model of disaster recovery ‘best practice’ of community engagement. 
This paper contributes to an enhanced understanding of community engagement in disaster recovery by, first, drawing 
on 'peacetime' participation literature and secondly, illustrating a case study of post-disaster community-led planning 
in Diamond Harbour. We argue that roles for community groups vary, but that some communities would rather have 
influence than decision-making ability, and that this influence can take a number of forms. Though peacetime 
participation typologies are useful, we suggest that there may be value in combining development studies with 
scholarship around disaster recovery to account for the suspension of formal modes of participation that often 
accompanies disasters. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is strong consensus in the disaster 
recovery literature that public participation is 
essential for a ‘good’ recovery (Chavan, Peralta, & 
Steins, 2007; Coles & Buckle, 2004; Norman, 
2004; Philips, 2004; ; Spee, 2008; Vallance, 
2011a; Ward et al. 2008) yet there remains a gap 
in our understanding of a disaster recovery ‘best 
practice’ of community engagement, and how it 
might be undertaken amidst the chaos and 
dysfunction that accompanies – and indeed 
defines - disaster. Too often, it is simply assumed 
that communities will be willing and able to 
participate in the recovery process, and that 
recovery authorities will welcome, encourage, 
and enable this participation (Coghlan, 2004; 
Norman, 2004; Philips, 2004; Vallance, 2011b), 
yet this not always the case. Indeed, a growing 
strand of literature documents the ways in which 
communities’ post-disaster aspirations are 
deliberately denied through opaque decision-
making pathways, the suspension of democratic  
 
 
 
rights, and local or state governments using post-
disaster reconstruction as an opportunity to push  
through their own agendas (Klein, 2007; Gotham 
and Greenberg, 2008). In this context, it becomes  
all the more important that we better understand 
the challenges community groups face in 
facilitating their own recoveries, and the 
strategies that they adopt to overcome them.  In 
attempting to promote a better appreciation of 
‘community-led planning’, our research focussed 
on one motivated community group - the 
Stoddart Point Regeneration Ideas Group (SPRIG). 
SPRIG is a community network that was 
established post-earthquake in the coastal 
settlement of Diamond Harbour, and their efforts 
were triggered by the damage inflicted on the 
keystone building of Godley House (as depicted in 
Figure 1 below). Our research examined how this 
group developed ‘plans’ for the improvement of 
this site, and the recovery of the community 
more holistically, after the recent earthquakes in 
Canterbury.  
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 1. ‘COMMUNITY-LED’ PLANNING AND DISASTER 
RECOVERY  
Various theoretical frameworks exist that may 
be used to categorise a community’s involvement 
in disasters. Whilst some of these, focussing on 
the disaster response phase (including rescue and 
relief), are well-developed, there is less scholarly 
information available around the public’s role in 
longer-term recovery (including rebuilding and 
reconstruction). There is a paucity of research 
detailing communities’ planning efforts and 
aspirations, or their engagement with formal 
state representatives; however, a great deal of 
work has been conducted on orthodox 
‘peacetime’ models, including Arnstein’s (1969) 
ladder of citizen participation, Pretty, Guijt, 
Thompson and Scoones’ (1985) typology and the 
International Association of Participation 2’s 
spectrum, with each documenting a continuum of 
engagement/participatory practices. These range 
from ‘token’ or ‘passive’ informing through 
consulting, involving and collaborating, to 
‘meaningful’ or ‘active’ empowering 
(www.iap2.org) forms of participation where the 
agency agrees to implement the community’s 
decisions. ‘Community-led planning’ arguably 
represents the most empowered form of 
participation where decisions are made by, and 
for, the people according to their aspirations. 
Though these provide useful guidelines, the post-
disaster context does add a layer of complexity to 
these typologies, largely because normal state 
processes of engagement may be suspended 
(formally under a state of national emergency, or 
informally due to dysfunction); the platform on 
which elected officials gained their mandate may 
have become utterly irrelevant; or the new 
context may generate issues about which the 
state is largely oblivious. In this context, it may be 
more appropriate to draw on literature from 
‘development studies’ of nascent democracies, 
where the state is assumed to be somewhat 
distant and/or preoccupied. This branch of 
scholarship is more concerned with models of 
informal, insurgent or transgressive planning in 
order to explain, for example, DIY urbanism, 
vigilantism, and grassroots movements.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Godley House, post-earthquake (Geoff Trotter)  
 
Perhaps as a consequence of these additional 
factors, disaster scholarship has yet to 
comprehensively adopt and adapt orthodox 
participatory schema in a meaningful way, 
though the empirical evidence to do so is 
accruing: Davidson, Johnson, Lizarralde, Dikmen 
& Sliwinski (2007, p.100) compared four case 
studies exhibiting different types of ‘active’ 
community participation, from supplying the 
labour force at one extreme to taking an active 
role in decision-making and project management 
at the other. They found that having the 
opportunity to make meaningful choices led to 
more positive results. Unfortunately, the authors 
also noted that ‘despite often-good intentions, 
this level of participation is rarely obtained and 
the [community’s] capabilities are often 
significantly wasted’ (2007, p. 100).  Others talk 
about the relationship between the communities 
and recovery authorities in terms of social capital 
(Aldrich, 2011; Murphy, 2007; Lorenz, 2010; 
Pelling and High, 2005; and Vallance, 2011a and 
b). Hawkins and Maurer (2010), for example, 
found that bonding capital (based on close ties) 
was vital in terms of immediate support, but that 
bridging and linking social capital (between 
communities and government) was important for 
longer-term recovery and neighbourhood 
revitalization. The role of bridging and linking 
social capital post-disaster has been explored in 
terms of ‘participative capacity’ (Lorenz, 2011) 
which presents another lens through which 
community-led planning may be explored.     
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2. COMMUNITY INTELLIGENCE, CIVIC EXPERTISE 
AND MANDATE  
In the aftermath of the Canterbury 
earthquakes, local, regional and central 
government (through the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority) have all played a role in 
recovery. Although this combination of elected 
bodies may be regarded as the best 
representation of the wishes of ‘the people’ in a 
democracy (Arnstein, 1969), it may also be seen 
as a ‘top down’ approach that potentially 
marginalises parts of society and may leave 
communities disenfranchised (Coles & Buckle, 
2004; Philips, 2004). The issue of adequate 
representation and mandate is particularly 
difficult post-disaster because processes designed 
to deal with incremental or rational modification 
are unable to cope with rapid, unpredictable and 
catastrophic change. Even the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002, which has the 
aim of encouraging key stakeholders to work 
together and to develop the capabilities of 
communities to plan for themselves post-disaster 
(Norman, 2004), seemed unable to adequately 
legislate for civic involvement. The recent Review 
of the Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Response to the 22 February Christchurch 
Earthquake found that even during the response 
phase, community groups lacked an effective 
conduit to the Christchurch Response Centre 
(CRC) or held a recognised place within the 
Coordinated Incident Management System 
(CIMS). This effectively isolated most 
communities from decision-makers right from the 
beginning, and has arguably shaped the recovery 
as well. Though the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority (CERA) is statutorily bound to 
promote public partipcation as part of the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act’s purpose, 
the relationship between communities and 
decision-makers within CERA is unclear. 
 
Another factor influencing the recovery is the 
geotechnical nature of the process which further 
excludes public participation. It has been argued 
that the public lacks the necessary geological 
expertise and that there is little room to 
accommodate community aspirations in the face 
of engineering, geotechnical and economic 
realities. This raises interesting questions about 
the role of ‘community intelligence’ in recovery 
processes, the communication that takes place 
between recovery agencies and the public, and 
the types of issues community networks seek to 
change or influence (Cuthill & Fien, 2005). It is 
particularly interesting to us given the literary 
consensus that community participation – at 
some level is cathartic, can help identify workable 
solutions; can be cost effective, can secure buy in 
and consumer confidence; can promote political 
stability (Olshansky, 2007; Chavcan et al.; 
Monday, 2002;  Benight, 2004; Campanella, 2006; 
Kweit and Kweit, 2004); and be ‘sustainable’ in 
the sense that communities do not become 
dependent on external sources of funding for the 
recovery (Lawther, 2009). What is less clear is the 
type of participation that delivers these benefits. 
 
If empowered communities with decision-
making powers tend to facilitate recovery and 
deliver these benefits, further questions are 
raised about the mandate of community leaders’ 
and their right to speak on behalf of ‘the people’. 
One of the greatest challenges identified in the 
literature is getting the whole community – some 
members of which are likely traumatised by the 
event - to coordinate and communicate together 
(Becker, Kerr, & Saunders, 2006; Monday, 2002; 
Vallance, 2011b; Norman, 2004). Further,  diverse 
communities  may be dominated by particular 
groups, with strong ideals, and it may be hard for 
some members of the community to speak 
against this without fear of being ostracised 
(Shaw, 1997). A significant challenge for 
community-led planning is, therefore, the 
mandate under which it occurs in the absence of 
democratic or other recognised traditions.  
 
The questions raised here, about community 
intelligence, mandate and type of participation 
that delivers significant benefits for the 
community were explored in the context of a 
particular case study. This paper revolves around 
lessons and insights derived from the Stoddart 
Point Regeneration Ideas Group – or SPRIG - vis-
à-vis community led planning and associated 
challenges and opportunities. Our conclusions are 
based on observations and in-depth interviews 
with SPRIG members. The fieldwork was 
conducted mid- to late 2011, approximately one 
year after the first earthquake.1   
1 A more detailed methodology is available in Love, R. 
(2012). Community led planning in post-disaster recovery: A. 
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3. THE ROLE AND MANDATE OF THE COMMUNITY 
IN RECOVERY IN DIAMOND HARBOUR  
Given New Zealand’s ‘peacetime’ planning and 
regulatory framework, it was not seen as possible 
or ideal for the community to develop, design or 
formulate a comprehensive ‘plan’ as might be 
outlined in formal statutory documents. The 
SPRIG membership acknowledged early on that 
they had neither the skills nor the mandate to do 
so. Yet they still saw an important role in 
undertaking background work so that they could 
make a useful contribution to more official 
procedures that they assumed would follow at 
some later date. Our research suggested that, 
over time, SPRIG members decided that its role 
within the community and planning process was 
to act as a facilitator of ideas and motivating 
force that might encourage the community to 
participate in formal recovery plans. This was 
pointed out explicitly by the interviewees who 
told us: 
 
“The main purpose is that it’s about 
facilitating the processes of recovery and 
capturing and doing something useful with ideas. 
Moving them into reality some of them, but not in 
itself being a decision making body”. 
  
“It [SPRIG] was created with the purpose of 
the need to do something to draw people back 
and make it a destination with lots of options for 
people to increase tourist numbers”. 
 
“I think it is really important that in 
rejuvenating the community by new facilities and 
structures, but also businesses, and the social 
structure of the community, that there is grass 
roots participation”. 
 
Yet, as interviewee one pointed out, the group 
understood that the community should not be 
making all the decisions, as they are not the ones 
1A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Master of Applied Science at 
Lincoln University Diamond Harbour case study. A 
dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Master of Applied Science at 
Lincoln University  
who have to implement or monitor the resultant 
plans.  
In the end, the person who has to implement 
the plan is the council. The council owns all the 
infrastructure and services, and a bunch of 
private individuals are creating the plan... But the 
council runs them on behalf of the 
community…Councils also represent the views of 
groups such as businesses. And they look at all 
the views, so the approach they take is actually 
community planning that fits in with the councils 
systems, so they can actually implement it. 
 
To overcome this tension, SPRIG adopted the 
role of facilitators and chose to create an ‘ideas 
paper’ by seeking contributions from the wider 
Diamond Harbour community. The first step in 
the process involved the local Community Board 
representative convening a meeting for the 
community to discuss the plans for the Godley 
House site. At that public meeting, a member of 
what was to become SPRIG noticed that there 
were a few passionate individuals in the crowd, 
and approached them after the meeting with the 
intention of capturing that energy.  This led to the 
first community-led meeting where “Lots of 
thoughts and ideas were captured. Various 
people made their voices heard” (Interviewee 
one) and enough people from that initial meeting 
were interested in creating a group to manage 
the recovery of the Stoddart Point area. Since 
then, SPRIG have run their own local meetings, 
open to the public and advertised through the 
local paper. The group operates these meetings 
in an open forum format, with an agenda to keep 
on track. The relaxed attitude of the meetings has 
allowed for a fluid membership and input, 
described by interviewee three as an ‘informal’ 
setting “that has allowed for the flexibility of 
people to come in for a bit and leave again”. 
 
The ideas and suggestions captured at these 
meetings dealt with the future use of the Godley 
House site, and other concepts for the 
redevelopment of the Stoddart Point area. During 
the meetings, SPRIG gave itself the task of 
developing an ‘ideas paper’ titled Getting to the 
Point that will include some of the workable and 
desirable recovery options for the Stoddart Point 
area. The ideas paper was drafted out of all the 
possibilities presented, both at the initial public 
meeting called by the Community Board and 
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through the group’s ideas. The group intends to 
take this document to the local Community 
Association (the pre-existing Residents 
Association) for suggestions and approval, and 
thereafter back to the community for comment. 
The purpose behind this is to gauge support for 
certain ideas and to gather feedback. Once this 
process is complete, a document will be created 
and presented to the local authorities: “Then we 
would like the Christchurch City Council to 
prepare a detailed plan for redevelopment based 
on the outcomes of the community consultations 
held.” 
 
The group has purposely called the draft 
document an ‘ideas paper’, as they did not want 
to give the impression that they have created a 
formal plan, with some statutory backing, for the 
area. The purpose of the paper is to collate all of 
the different possibilities for the area and to 
encourage the public to debate what they want 
on the site. It was hoped that by leaving the 
process open, and giving it that title, the ideas 
paper would act as a ‘spark’ for the community. 
This aspiration is also highlighted in SPRIG’s 
documentation: 
 
This paper summarises the community’s vision 
for the Godley House site in context of the whole 
of Stoddart Point. The overall purpose of this 
paper is to provide the community an articulated 
vision for their further input and comments, 
building from the consultation already 
undertaken. It is also intended to provide 
inspiration and a launching platform for the next 
step. 
 
Key features of their consultation process 
included raising awareness of the Stoddart Point 
music festival (Figure 2); communicating through 
various media including pamphlets, mail drops, 
and developing a website; talking with locals they 
knew lived around the area; and the deliberate 
use of the term ‘ideas paper’ rather than ‘plan’. 
Interviewees repeatedly made it clear that they 
were aware of the danger of becoming a group 
that was planning with the community to a group 
that tries to plan for the community.  
 
4. DISCUSSION  
 
Though the literature clearly indicates the 
importance of public participation in disaster 
recovery, ‘peacetime’ planning scholarship 
recognises a range of types of 
involvement/engagement and degrees of 
community empowerment. The issue addressed 
in this paper centres on the kinds of participation 
that might deliver the benefits indicated in the 
literature. Our results indicate that community 
members do not neccessarly want to have 
decision-making powers and that ‘empowered’ 
participation might take a number of different 
forms. In this case study, SPRIG wanted to have 
the abilty to  influence planning processes, and its 
outcomes, but did not want decision-making 
authority.  SPRIG members therefore walked a 
somewhat awkward path between understanding 
it was not their place to hold power or make 
decisions but, at the same time, needed some 
kind of legitimacy in order to act as a credible 
contributor to more official processes. They knew 
they lacked the mandate to act as decision-
makers but were keen to take on a number of 
other roles including building awareness; bringing 
the community together and resolving some early 
conflicts; gathering information about the area, 
and becoming a ‘community’ with capability and 
capacity to become engaged in formal processes. 
They become empowered through recognition 
that their contribution was meaningful. SPRIG 
members understood the value of community 
input and their possession of specialised local 
knowledge including their ability to identify 
errors in plans that recovery agencies may 
otherwise miss. They also believed that the 
community are the most important stakeholders 
as they have to live with the consequences of the 
plan.  Including community groups from the 
outset, they maintained, could avoid the 
development of plans that were controversial, 
inadequate, or that missed unique opportunities.  
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 Figure 2: SPRIG’s Music Festival at Stoddart Point 
 
Though there is a great deal of literature 
devoted to the benefits of ‘good’ community 
engagement and consensus as to its benefits, 
very little work exists around the steps that could 
be taken by communities to facilitate and foster 
the process.   Our research suggests that before 
any ‘consultation’ or ‘engagement’ occurs, it is 
helpful if a group of people (re)form a community 
of practice to discuss what a satisfactory process 
would entail, and what the relationship between 
community groups and recovery agencies should 
look like. Recovery authorities can actively 
encourage, facilitate (by providing meeting 
spaces and other resources) and even fund such 
groups if such mobilisation is seen as desirable. 
SPRIG members believed that they would best 
operate as a liaison between the community and 
the local authorities, primarily to enable a swift 
and easy transfer of information between the 
two parties. This does raise some interesting 
dilemmas for the recovery agencies and/or local 
government officials given they have limited 
understanding of how the community’s ideas 
were generated, facilitated or captured.  
Nonetheless, when triangulated with other, more 
orthodox means of consultation, involvement or 
engagement, the community intelligence 
generated by such groups can be extremely 
useful.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Many of the suggestions about the benefits, 
difficulties and challenges associated with 
different types of public participation, 
involvement and engagement literature are 
supported by this case study. Further, our 
research suggests great merit in harvesting the 
‘peacetime’ participation literature for the 
purposes of developing a ‘best practice’ around 
community engagement in disaster recovery 
because such literature emphasises there is a 
spectrum of possible approaches, depending on 
the overall goal. Such nuance is often missing 
from disaster scholarship community 
engagement models. Conversely, despite their 
value, we cannot simply apply ‘peacetime’ 
engagement models to the disaster recovery 
context because, critically, both ‘the community’ 
and ‘the state’ may be dysfunctional. Indeed, this 
is almost certainly the case given the nature of 
disasters. 
 
The role of community groups in recovery 
planning needs to be evaluated in this light; in 
SPRIG’s case it was assumed that formal 
processes of engagement would eventually be 
restored and they developed their recovery 
strategy on this basis. They therefore saw their 
role as helping the community become an entity 
capable of being engaged more formally, 
generating interest in the area and its 
possibilities, keeping civic interest alive until 
more formal processes of engagement were 
restored, and facilitating good working relations 
between the local council and the local 
community. Importantly, SPRIG demonstrates 
that communities do not always want to possess 
decision making authority, but they do want to 
be able to influence the process in a meaningful 
way. Members were aware that they lacked an 
electoral mandate to make decisions, but sought 
to complement, enhance and invigorate more 
official channels. They sought influence rather 
than power, and wished to be recognised by the 
local authorities as a legitimate and valued part 
of the official recovery effort for the Stoddart 
Point area. A process of triangulation with 
orthodox consultation and engagement 
strategies might be a useful way of resolving the 
tension between using community intelligence 
and accepting their unusual mandate.  
   
 
On a related point, our research also 
highlights the value of fostering ‘community 
competence’ or ‘civic expertise’ as both a 
preparedness and risk reduction strategy, 
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particularly as they relate to resilience as a 
function of an entity’s ability to bounce back, or 
even thrive, in the face of change. The SPRIG case 
study illustrates some of the skills and capabilities 
this community needed to achieve their goal, and 
it is useful to reflect on the various ways critical 
competencies - including conflict and data 
management, communication, leadership, 
fundraising, and so on -  might be incorporated 
into more standard, peacetime activities.  
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